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τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν1: Another look at being, asking
what a interlocutor means to show by saying they feel themselves to be
something. An ambiguity of the verb ”to be” is disambiguated to reveal
that it can be meant to show what something is and a process of being
something. The relationship between being and essence is made by de-
scribing engagement through the encounter, giving us a non-exhaustive
account of something’s essence. Practice is then understood as a process
within a social context where humans form the senses in which one can be,
with their possibilities informed by encounters with what is substantive
of those senses. The resulting implications with regards to authenticity,
social belonging, and anthropology are briefly discussed.
We speak all the time of ourselves being something, and we do so naturally.
I must often say that I was being sarcastic. If we gather together to play a sport,
someone might say to another “you’ll be the goal keeper.” In the aftermath of
a quarrel, perhaps I would say “I was being insulted.” As small talk, I might
ask “what’s it like being a teacher?” Before a date, someone might say to a
nervous person “just be yourself.” A particularly curious case– after a mundane
1”All things move and nothing remains still.” (Plato & Reeve, 1998) (Cratylus 401d)
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interaction, a friend of mine remarked that “doing that, I finally felt myself to
be Armenian.”
This verb ‘to be’ has its many ambiguities. Of interest is ‘to be’ as used to
show us what is, and to show us what things are. In the examples I previously
enumerated, ‘to be’ is used to show someone existing and subsequently behaving
in a particular manner. In the process of living our lives, we find that we must
often be many things. We express ourselves with regards to the things we must
often be– but what do we mean when we speak of being in this manner?
I.
It is inevitable that when we speak of being, we touch on that difficult sub-
ject of being qua being. My intent here however is not to answer a so-called
‘fundamental question of Being qua being,’ or what Heidegger refers to as the
settling of “a battle of giants concerning being.2” Neither is it to evaluate the
structure of being as a word used in the English language, or to ask “what is
the logical form of the statement ‘I am?’” Rather I hope to orient towards an
inquiry into being that begins with the question: “what is meant to be shown
when one speaks of being?”
With regards to being qua being, we must keep in mind that there are many
categories of what is meant when we speak of being– to quote Aristotle: “there
are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related
to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere
ambiguity.3” Metaphysics describes five senses in which something is, but of
particular interest to my inquiry is the distinction between substance, where the
essence of a substance is what the thing must be to be itself, and a process to-
2 καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμϕισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς
ἀλλήλους. (Plato, 1921) (Sophist 246a)
3 τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ ϕύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως (Aristotle,
1933) (Metaphysics 1003a)
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wards substance. When we describe ourselves as being something, there’s never
the question that we are at that moment being something other than ourselves,
and the person with whom we speak never asks if this description is meant to
indicate that we’ve taken on a different ontological character. Sometimes, we
feel that what we are being is in some sense conflicting with what we believe
ourselves to be. Therefore, one can say that there is the fact that we are and
there is the state of ourselves being something.
I argue that what is spoken of when we speak about us ‘being,’ stylizing
as such to separate it from the rather ambiguous English verb “to be,” we
mean to show ourselves in a movement towards the essence indicated by the
predicate. When my friend remarks that “doing that, I finally felt myself to be
Armenian,” he means to show that he feels himself moving towards an essence
of ‘being’ Armenian. When I tell you that I’m ‘being’ sarcastic, I likely mean to
show you that you were mistaken about the true nature of what I was being– I’m
hinting at the true essence of what I meant. What is of interest here is not the
affectation one presents when one hopes to ‘be’ something. That is a question
of what it means to be Armenian or sarcastic. Rather, of interest here is the
process of ‘being’ itself that is undertaken to reveal something about an essence
in question that is not simply the essence of what we believe ourselves to be.
Whether my friend is Armenian or not is besides the point as the statement “I
am being Armenian” is not equivalent to the statement “I am Armenian;” the
latter is a statement about one’s nationality or ethnic identity but the former
refers to a process at hand. The proposition “I am Armenian” is a statement
about how things stand, and “I am being Armenian” expresses a belief about
the nature of what the interlocutor is doing.
First we must address a basic principle of substance and its essence, that
which is necessary in the substance for the substance to ‘be’ itself. My emphasis
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on what is shown rather than what plainly-spoken is lies contingent on the fact
that the essences of substances are not immediate but rather revealed by a
process I will call here engagement. Engagement is when an encounter occurs
between things, revealing some kind of quality that hints at its essence. In
the case of one ‘being’ Armenian, it would in fact be chauvinistic to claim
that the essence of ‘being’ Armenian is immediate– something one can wholly
understand by perception. Rather I suggest here that the essence of ‘being’
Armenian comes from the process of ‘being’ Armenian, allowing its “coming to
presence4” through engagement.
Engagement happens through the encounter. When we encounter some-
thing, we are inevitably put into touch with some essence that is shown by
the nature of our engagement. It cannot ever be said that we encounter the
essence in its entirety– if you and I engage the same object5, we might leave
with entirely different encounters, entirely different impressions of its essence
even though the object was the same. An encounter leaves with a sense of what
we’re engaging with, a mode of presentation6 that gives us one aspect of what
we are encountering. This property of engagement isn’t limited to humans, as
reactions between two things may also differ– water that engages with mercury
reveals different properties compared to water that engages with potassium.
Though encounters are not anthropocentric, cognition is necessary for us to say
that an encounter leaves one with knowledge of the other’s essence. A thing
without engagement in relation to anything cannot be said to have properties,
whether this is even possible of a thing is a question of ontology.7
4Heidegger, M., & Lovitt, W. (1977). The question concerning technology, and other
essays. Garland Pub.
5I distinguish things from objects to make clear a distinction between a discrete physical
form we recognize as an object and the greater ‘world’ of things which includes objects.
6Often translated as such but better translated as Art des Gegebenseins, a way of having
been, used by Frege in Über Sinn und Bedeutung and perverted here. Can we know every
sense of what we encounter? Here I will also quote Frege: “Dahin gelangen wir nie;” we never
get there. (Frege & Voigt, 2019)
7To be clear on what is meant by this, even fictional things, concepts, and thoughts have
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This encounter is ultimately forced upon us, as engagement is always de-
manded of us. We cannot make a decision of whether or not our encounter with
the thing occurs. It happens when perceive it or conceive of it– if it’s there
we encounter it. This encounter leaves us irrevocably changed, and doing away
with the thing does nothing to change this quality of the encounter. We might
remember its existence, and we’ll ask “what happened to it?” It might remind
us of other memories, it might elicit an emotional response because we’re hungry
or it has sentimental value to us. We in this sense feel ourselves to ‘be’ moved
by our encounter with this substance, and engagement may very well reveal
something about ourselves. Encountering a bear might reveal phobia for such
creatures, while engagement with something we are allergic to causes a physical
reaction that reveals something about our physical nature. Adopting a role such
as teacher or goal keeper may give us the opportunity to learn about ourselves
or the social-systems of the world we live in. Engagement here is a continual
process of encounters; in this process, a sense of the things involved are always
brought to presence but never all at once, and this is true of properties that
we hope to show when we speak of ‘being.’ Therefore, I argue ‘being’ itself is
a continuous process, a ποίησις that brings-forth8 and moves us towards an
essence rather than a passive property of our existence.
II.
Now we must address the connection between practice and what we speak of
when we speak of ‘being’ something. Being qua being is the business of all that
is but when we speak of ‘being’ something, we mean that we find ourselves in
the condition of practicing what we believe ourselves to ‘be.’ In Ancient Greek,
properties we engage with. By thing with no properties, I do not mean simply nonexistent
things.
8Using Heideggerian terminology to stress that this process is revealing what is concealed,
a disclosure (Erschlossenheit)
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πρᾶξις contrasts itself from ποίησις as action versus bringing something into
existence– ποίησις refers to creation and production9 while πρᾶξις10 refers
to a condition of practicing something. The process of ‘being’ as ποίησις is
made possible by a practice that allows for engagement with what we believe
ourselves to ‘be,’ as it is within practicing what we believe ourselves to ‘be’ that
we engage with what is substantive of what we are.
Existence itself is not identical to ‘being’ as we speak of it. Whatever the
content or ontological character of existence may be, we should make the point
that existence is a necessity that precedes ‘being.’ In order for something to
‘be,’ we should accept that it must first exist or else speaking of its ‘being’
is meaningless. Something is or it’s not– if something is, this is shown by
virtue of its existence, not its substance. I make this distinction in the hopes of
showing why we should speak of practice as a matter of ‘being’ but not existence.
Practice doesn’t engage with the fact that we exist, but rather our ‘being.’ We
do not practice existing, as existing is a lemma to the fact that something is,
yet we practice ‘being.’
When Hamlet asks “to be, or not to be,” what he means is really “to exist,
or not to exist.” However, if Hamlet were to say “to be Hamlet, or not to be
Hamlet,” I argue he would not be asking a question about existing but a question
about what is meant when one says he feels to ‘be’ Hamlet. One cannot feel
like she does not exist as to ask this question is to exist11 but one can feel like
she is not ‘being’ herself. To put it succinctly– one by necessity is, but there’s
the feeling that one must endeavor to ‘be.’ A dog of course exists, but to speak
of it as it needing to endeavor ‘being’ a dog seems meaningless as the dog does
not possess the faculty to ‘be’ something else nor does it question whether to be
9 ποίησις Liddell, H., & Scott, R. (1897). A greek-english lexicon (8th Edition). Clarendon
Press
10 πρᾶξις Liddell, H., & Scott, R. (1897). A greek-english lexicon (8th Edition). Clarendon
Press
11Refer to the Cartesian tautology (e)go sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans.
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itself or not. Likewise objects encounter other objects, and in doing so engage
with the properties of other objects, but to speak of water as endeavoring to
‘be’ water when it reacts with potassium is meaningless. The engagement and
its constituent encounters are by no means limited to those with consciousness,
but practicing ‘being’ as far as we know occurs only in homo ēns– the human
with cognition who therefore knows she not only exists but is. The homo ēns
is akin to the potter who shapes the natural, indefinite clay of the world into a
meaningful and discrete form– a ποίησις that gives her a place in which to ‘be,’
a structure12 which gives form in the sense of what is compared to the natural
formless of what isn’t. Practices enact the potential suggested by the form of
the essence of what we are ’being,’ as understood through the encounter.
Here our pupil Elisabeth would ask: “but what exactly is meant to be shown
by the word ’practice?’ Can you point to practice in the world?” Practice is
what I call this condition of ‘being,’ what we are speaking of when we speak of
‘being’ something. When I’m practicing ‘being’ a teacher, I am in engagement
with spheres13 of language, institutions, social roles, and physical space. In the
practice of ‘being’ a teacher, I encounter the essence of what I speak of when I
speak of ‘being’ a teacher even though there are many different senses in which
one can ‘be’ a teacher. It is in this process of practice that I as homo ēns
learn what it means to ‘be’ a teacher, and in this practice of ‘being’ a teacher
I show myself moving towards the essence of what is substantive of a teacher
while always falling short of knowing its essence in its entirety. Through the
practice of ’being’ a teacher, I make actual the potentials its essence reveals
to us. Therefore the spheres of homo ēns are spheres of practice, built by the
human who always endeavors to ‘be,’ encountering the wider world around her
12These structures are curiously malleable, we can speak of infinitely many senses in which
we are ‘being’ something without confusion about what is meant with its use.
13Drawing here from Sloterdijk’s description of “the original product of human co-existence,”
spaces that by being inhabited gain “form, content, extension and relative duration.” (Sloter-
dijk, 2011)
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and defining it through her continual practice. To ‘be’ something is always in
the context of a wider world of things which are, shaped by the homo ēns who
forms her world and establishes what is.14 In summation, through encountering
the properties of what demands engagement from us, we form senses of the
possibilities and potentials15 of what is in our world, what we might practice,
and through the process of practice we show ourselves to endeavor ‘being.’
III.
Now that we have a clearer understanding of what we speak of when we speak
of being, it’ll be instructive to address the notion of authenticity. Throughout
our lives we endeavor to ‘be’ many things, but often find ourselves needing to
draw a distinction between what we are and what we are ‘being.’ An example
of this would be that one might hear people remark “that’s not who I am,” or
might offer as advice “just be yourself.” We intuitively understand that this is
not a statement about the essence of the person in question– we do not react
by asking how it is possible for you to be anything but yourself at all times.
Rather, we show with this utterance that the practice in question is not moving
towards what we feel to be the essence of what we are. If I’m being dishonest,
but feel myself to be essentially an honest person, I would of course remark
“I’m being dishonest but I’m actually an honest person” with which I mean to
show that my inauthentic endeavor is purposefully straying from what I believe
myself to be.
‘Being’ here has an informative sense. Something is meant by the statement
“I am learning something about myself,” which can be stated in more succinct
14A corollary to the proposition “die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner
Welt,” or “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (Wittgenstein, 1922)
15By possibilities and potentials, I mean the causal relations forming the potentiality of
what we encounter. Every engagement gives us a sense of possibility as we learn more about
the properties of what we encounter. The connection between possibilities, essences, and
encounters should be addressed in a later paper.
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terms as “I am learning about what I am speaking of when I speak of ‘being’
myself.” In interaction with the authenticity of a practice, our perception allows
us to make a connection between the ontic and the ontological. Animals and
machines have no concept of ontology, therefore no conception of authenticity as
for the animal or the machine there exists perception of the ontic but no question
of whether what is perceived is authentic since they possess no conception of
‘being.16’ To speak of a dog acting authentically is meaningless, for the dog has
no ontological conception of ‘being.’ All dogs act authentically, as do machines.
However for humans, who have the experience of feeling to ‘be’ something, a
practice is felt to be authentic in relation to what one feels themselves to be.
We must be clear that the purpose of this distinction is not to find a chau-
vinistic method of separation between the acceptable and unacceptable, to say
that some act is authentic and some other act is not. That is not a statement
of ontology, but rather one of normative ethics as the injunction made by the
utterance of some act being inauthentic and thus unacceptable is that it should
not be done. Calling a practice inauthentic is not a pejorative. Performing a
role in a play is intentionally acting inauthentic for an artistic purpose. Rather,
authenticity here must be understood as a quality17 of practice which shows
that what is shown by ‘being’ is not to reveal what we are. One always is, but
one can feel that what she is ‘being’ is not what she is.
Elisabeth could say “well, that person might not feel themselves to be acting
authentically but that is because she does not know what she is.” We could say
that the dog itself is acting authentically or inauthentically but simply does not
16We should be careful not to find our own anthropocentric projections as proof otherwise,
as one can easily ascribe human states to machines and animals. (e.g. ”it’s being sneaky,”
”it’s being annoying.”) There is however the possibility that this is incorrect, and that animals
in fact do have a conception of ‘being’ but one that we can neither recognize nor understand.
However, since we cannot evaluate this possibility I prefer the parsimonious option.
17I present this quality without moral qualification. The question of inauthenticity’s desir-
ability or morality should be disambiguated from its meaning, though they are by no means
completely separate.
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know when. I feel this to be an undesirable position because it opens us to asking
if machines can also act authentically, and an account of authenticity that does
not speak strictly of one’s own experience of ‘being’ will undoubtedly devolve
into vague cliché. It also makes a categorical error, for ‘being’ itself is not purely
an expression or speech-act made by a person. One might express something
as motivated by a feeling of ‘being,’ but the expression is not identical to what
someone is speaking of when they speak of ‘being–’ no expression can relate fully
what we’re ’being,’ it can only grant a glimpse. Therefore we are incapable of
making this distinction of authenticity for the person who speaks of ‘being,’ as
only the person who speaks of ‘being’ can have the experience of authenticity
which relates their feeling of ‘being’ to the practice. Authenticity described as a
quality of ‘being’ is an internal experience, separate from expressing normative
approval of an external act or object as authentic. One intuitively understands
for herself when she means to show herself ‘being’ authentic or not authentic
in practice, but this intuition cannot be set outwards onto others or else deceit
and lying would be impossible.
We must also avoid certain clichés, which rather than give us a glimpse
into this ‘being’ instead leads us into a rhetorical position. For example, if
someone believing themselves to ‘be’ Armenian were to claim in reference to
something happening external to his ‘being’ that “Armenians who authentically
feel themselves to ‘be’ Armenian don’t do that,” we are not awarded any light
into what it means for that person to ‘be’ Armenian. Firstly, he might be wrong
or mistaken on an empirical level– perhaps Armenians who authentically feel
themselves to ‘be’ Armenian in fact do “that” but this person did not witness
them and thus made an error in judgment. Secondly, the distinction drawn lies
with the practice in question of “that” even though ‘being’ Armenian is not a
quality of “that” but a quality of a person feeling themselves to ‘be’ that way.
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A practice has no such inherent quality, there is nothing about it which makes
it intrinsically felt to ‘be’ authentic. Rather it is the people engaging in the
practicing who themselves feel to ‘be’ authentic in performing that practice,
which is why someone might say that the authenticity of a performance of said
practice is uncertain if people who did not authentically feel themselves to ‘be’
Armenian performed that practice.
homo ēns’s creation of spheres of practice always exists within relations
of human co-existence, so it cannot be said that the authentic exists within
itself purely as an internal experience. Rather authenticity lies between the
interaction of ‘being’ with the practice meant to engage it. We feel ourselves to
‘be’ authentically, and identify the practice that we’ve formed within the world
with that experience. We cannot assume the authenticity of others, nor can
we intuit it, but our spheres of practice hold their proximity to ‘being’ on the
notion of the authentic. Our ideas about what others are ‘being’ always assumes
authenticity, that those spoken of as practicing are always moving towards the
essence of what they are ‘being.18’ Therefore the authentic is not something
one purely feels about herself in isolation, but something one feels about herself
within the relations of human co-existence that form her spheres of practice.
There is no private practice, for in practice we show ourselves to ‘be,’ and
the senses of what one can ‘be’ must be shown by creating these spheres of
practice.19 To speak of authenticity in a society of one is meaningless, as there
would be nothing to show by ‘being–’ no expression of what I feel myself to ‘be’
would be necessary and thus none would develop. One exists in private, but it
18This assumption is what makes deceit and lying possible.
19Here one should invoke Wittgenstein’s remarks about private languages. In §257, he writes
“Well, let’s assume that the child is a genius and invents a name for the sensation by himself!
But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used the word. So does he
understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? But what does
it mean to say that he has ‘named his pain’? How has he managed this naming of pain? And
whatever he did, what was its purpose? When one says “He gave a name to his sensation”,
one forgets that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense.”
(Wittgenstein & Anscombe, 1997)
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is relation to others that she has a sense of what she’s ‘being;’ without a sense
of what one can ‘be,’ one merely is.
IV.
When I speak of a sense of what she’s ‘being’ in relation to others, I imply a
relationship between ‘being’ and belonging. If she feels herself to belong to a
group, she will inevitably think of how she must ‘be’ to be Armenian– a common
sentiment amongst those who question their identity or sense of belonging. “Am
I really Armenian if I don’t act Armenian?” What is shown when a Christian
believes themselves to ‘be’ Christian and thus belong? ‘Being’ itself is not a
social relation, but to practice ‘being’ something one undoubtedly thinks of a
social relation as there is no meaning to ‘being’ Christian if this sense does not
show something meaningful. If I speak of ‘being’ Christian to a community that
has no sense of what ‘being’ Christian means, I’m incapable of showing anything
until through practice I show what is meant when I speak of ‘being’ Christian.
This ποίησις of a sphere of practice gives ‘being’ Christian its sense, forming a
novel possibility of ‘being’ that can grant us another glimpse at the essence this
‘being’ orients us towards.
‘Being’ is not reducible to social relations. It is not sufficient to say that
the process of feeling to ‘be’ Christian occurs through engagement with its
symbols and social roles– one cannot20 place an arbitrary point at which one
is embedded enough within a social structure to begin feeling to‘be’ Christian.
Though an identity of ‘Christian’ may be imposed on the subject through a
social structure, it is from one’s own feeling of ‘being’ with which that social
20There are many practices with which one reifies this ‘being’ in the social sphere. In the
case of ‘being’ Christian, a ritual associates a practice with this essence of ‘being’ Christian.
In the case of nationality, a passport and the requisite practice of acquiring it reifies ‘being’
German. However, this is different from feeling to oneself ‘be’ German; one should not confuse
these reifying practices with the experience of ‘being’ that one has.
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structure is confronted. However the social structure must be there to bring
coherence and meaning to that feeling of ‘being’ Christian, otherwise it would
be meaningless to speak of it. A negation of ‘being’ Christian, “I will not ‘be’
a Christian,” is meaningful only in a social structure where one may feel she
knows essence of ‘being’ Christian and knows other do as well. For a Christian
in a social structure that has no conception of Islam to say “I will not ‘be’
Muslim” purely because she is Christian and therefore not Muslim doesn’t reveal
anything about what she’s ‘being’ because it is a tautology of definition, akin
to 1 = 1 •••1 ̸= 0. To ask someone to imagine what it feels to not ‘be’ Christian
is a meaningless question, for she could only draw on her experience of ‘being’
Christian. Likewise, it is impossible to ask someone who doesn’t feel themselves
to ‘be’ Christian what it means to ‘be’ Christian– she might be able to produce
an accurate picture of the technology of Christianity, of its books, history, or
mythology, but to her the question of what it means to ‘be’ Christian is an
impossible one to answer.
One might intuitively speak of ‘being’ Armenian as a drawing from an Arme-
nian cultural reserve. When one speaks of belonging or ‘being’ with regards to
a group, they might cite some commonality or generality that binds the group.
However, it is difficult to speak of the essence of ‘being’ Armenian as one can
never know this essence in entirety. One can make an account of the cultural
reserves, traditions, language, etc. but one cannot speak of a particular practice
that makes a ‘true’ Armenian. Therein lies a question– how can one ‘be’ Ar-
menian if one doesn’t do this specific thing or believe this specific notion from
whatever is the symbolic structure? I’d argue we should therefore reject this
question as unanswerable, for it would make it impossible or meaningless to
‘be’ Armenian as one cannot exhaust the meaning of ‘being’ Armenian or set
an arbitrary point of ‘being’ which would satisfy all Armenians. We often find
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this matter of ‘being’ creates conflict in our spheres of co-existence, where one
is given the legal status of e.g. French but then also expected to ‘be’ French
even though one for herself cannot say to feel as if she’s ‘being’ French simply
because she attains a legal status as such– accordingly, in our post-Nationalist
world many societies keep these spheres of legal Frenchness and ‘being’ French-
ness separate for the common good.
Meaning itself is not a physical quality inherent to objects or concepts, rather
it occurs in the engagement between that feeling of ‘being’ and the symbols and
social roles as privileged in interpretive anthropology. The sense in which ‘Chris-
tian’ is meaningful comes from the sphere of practice which builds its meaning,
but what one means when one says she feels herself to ‘be’ authentically Chris-
tian is a sense one must create for herself. An Armenian friend of mine once
remarked “doing that, I finally felt myself to be Armenian.” This is not a state-
ment about nationhood or ethnicity but rather an expression of himself finally
feeling to ‘be’ authentically, through a practice that put him in engagement
with the possibilities of what ‘being’ Armenian can mean to him. Each person
endeavors to ‘be’ for themselves, they must encounter the essence for themselves
to know in what sense one can authentically ‘be–’ even if practice is demanded
of us before we know the essence of what we are ‘being.’
How can one be certain that a person is authentically practicing what they
themselves believe to ‘be’ Christian? The anthropologist cannot avoid this ques-
tion, for it is the authenticity of its practicing that is of interest in study.21 The
anthropologist furthers her study with the hopes of transcending the limita-
tions of their own perspective, or otherwise the subject of study would not be
the culture of study but rather of the aforementioned perspective in relation to
said culture. Though all good scientists understand that they operate within
21See the controversy surrounding the authenticity of Margaret Mead’s study in Samoa that
raised questions about how one can be sure she is studying a culture as it is authentically.
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the dogmatic prejudices held by the tradition or culture they’ve been educated
in, they do their work with the belief that if said prejudices were removed what
remains is an authentic expression that reveals itself.
V.
In closing I’d like to address ‘being’ in relationship to anthropology, which dis-
tinguishes itself as the study of homo ēns’s nature unbroken into its constituent
atomic parts. Anthropology attempts with its multitude of subfields to enclose
the essence of homo ēns, to form enough glimpses of its nature so that one
may give it an educated definition. In that sense, Aristotle is perhaps the first
anthropologist who admitted that to study the human as merely animal would
fail to address what separates the human from animals.22 If we hold that what
separates the human from an animal is her feeling of ‘being’ something, then
those controversies strictly within anthropology should be understood as dis-
agreements on what homo ēns reveals to us by its ‘being.’ Culture itself should
be understood as these spheres of practice, continually redefining its possibili-
ties. It falls onto the anthropologist to define the canonical spheres of practice
in anthropology– she might say Kochari is a practice of dance canonically Ar-
menian, in contrast to drinking water which is not. Different spheres of practice
may inhabit different substrata without overlap, and each are a different en-
counter of the essence of what the anthropologist takes as her subject of study.
The gravity of defining canonical spheres may range from trivial to grave; an
anthropologist defining the practices of LGBT peoples as canonically Armenian
might have tremendous lasting impacts on the spheres of Armenian social &
political life.
22Kietzmann, C. (2019). Aristotle on the definition of what it is to be human. In G.
Keil & N. Kreft (Eds.), Aristotle’s anthropology (pp. 25–43). Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108131643.002
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To speak of essences in anthropology will rightfully garner reluctance &
skepticism. For an anthropologist to speak of a religion’s essence places her in
a position she wishes not to be, for such an inquiry inevitably drifts into messy
questions of personal interpretation that violate the anthropologist’s pretence
to detached scientific study.23 The anthropologist who speaks of her own un-
derstanding of a religion’s essence will be criticized for drifting into memoir, and
routinely dismissed due to the unreliability of her testimony. However, if the
anthropologist speaks of interpreting a religion’s symbols, history, the beliefs
of its adherents as merely forming impressions without certainty of its essence–
she is said to be doing scientific study. The anthropologist cannot speak of
humanity’s essence, rather she must hold that all these impressions converge to
form a lens that will give us a truthful encounter with the essence of homo ēns.
This is the well from which its meaning is drawn, the revealing of which is the
methodology of anthropologists influenced by Geertz’ conception of culture.24
Without an essence from which an interpretation draws its authority, the
anthropologist would find herself doomed to always engage in memoir as the
notion of a methodology ‘more scientifically sound’ would become meaningless;
if no symbol is more authoritative than the other, then there is no necessity for
the trained anthropologist. Therein lies the difficulty of anthropology. Though
the anthropologist cannot speak of this essence, she must perform her work with
the premise that it is there as she seeks for the universal in the particular. An-
thropology rises from memoir to science when it invokes the particular towards
the universal as its own end, as that is where science finds its authority. A
science that does not face towards the essence of its subject of study, ‘felt’ to
be closer through abstraction and formalization, has no authority as science as
23Monks who seek deeper understanding of what they believe to be their religion’s essence
almost always begin a process of detachment from their wider world.
24Geertz, P. (1966). Religion as a cultural system. In M. Banton (Ed.), Anthropological
approaches to the study of religion (pp. 1–46). Tavistock
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without essence the notion of reproducibility becomes meaningless– without an
essence to be reproduced, what is reproduced instead is the memoir. We must
either speak of anthropology as an attempt to enclose the essential nature of
man and thus ’pin-down’ an impression of it, or forfeit that possibility because
such essential natures do not exist and anthropology is merely memoir elevated
to the authority of science.
VI.
I hope that by disambiguating the verb ”to be,” I’ve made it clear that with ”to
be” we can make statements with which we show what is and statements with
which we show a process of ’being’ something. By manner of which I argue that
the question of being qua being with regards to ourselves is better addressed by
two questions: what are we and what are we being. I gave a definition of the
encounter, an act of us engaging with something that allows us for a revealing
of that something’s concealed essence. Following which I gave a definition of
practice, a creative process that creates a manner in which we may endeavour
to ’be’ and thereby show ourselves engaging with what is substantive of we are
’being.’ I then addressed the authentic to address how one might feel to ’be’
not herself, and the relationship between ’being’ and belonging. Lastly I briefly
addressed anthropology, and how a careful definition of ’being’ is of some import
on its methodology. 25
Further discussions could address the following:
• Can one speak of herself ’being’ something without appealing to the
essence substantive of that something? If the first principle from which
one applies to ‘being’ something doesn’t arise from an atomic fact, then
25Gratitude to Jacob Matthews, Sarkis Kassounian, and Elisabeth De Mont for their helpful
comments
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through what process does one learn what one can denote herself as ‘be-
ing?’
• Is there the possibility of a thing with no properties in engagement, there-
fore no essence to encounter? One can adopt either a Meinongian view
that such things are merely homeless, obscure until we are given the oppor-
tunity to bring them form through thought or a Russellian view that such
a statement only appears to be meaningful because of a misunderstanding
of descriptions.
• Can anthropology be a rigorous science (such as physics which describes
fundamental particles essential to matter) without appeal to a human
essence? If so, what is the atomic, or nuclear fact that anthropology
attempts to approach if not the question of what is meant when one is
‘being’ something?
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